Secure sketches and fu zzy extractors enable the use of biometric data in cryptographic applications by correct ing errors in noisy biometric readings and producing cryptographic materials suitable for many applications. Such constructions work by producing a public sketch, which is later used to reproduce the original biometric and all derived information exactly fr om a noisy biometric reading. It has been previously shown that release of multiple sketches associated with a single biometric presents security problems for certain constructions.
INTRODUCTION
The motivation for this work comes from practical use of biometric-derived data and its suitability for adop tion. Secure sketches and fuzzy extractors (Dodis et aI., 2004) were introduced as mechanisms of deriv ing cryptographic material from noisy biometric data, which can be used for authentication, encryption, and other purposes. Such constructions produce a helper string (secure sketch) -which is viewed as public -from a biometric and later re-produce the crypto graphic string from a close noisy biometric reading using the helper string. Only minimal information about the biometric should be leaked due to the re lease of the helper string.
While this powerful concept enables new applica tions and can be attractive to users who no longer need to maintain secrets to participate in cryptographic pro tocols, it has been shown that leakage of informa tion associated with the biometric in such construc tions is unavoidable (Smith, 2004; Dodis and Smith, 2005) . Furthermore, this concept has been more heav ily studied in the context when the construction is ap plied to a biometric only once. Consecutive publica-*This work was partially supported by grant FA9550-09-1 -0223 fr om the Air Force Office of Scientific Research.
tions (Boyen, 2004; Simoens et aI., 2009 ) explored the security guarantees of such schemes in terms of their reusability, when a single biometric or its noisy version is used to produce multiple secure sketches using the same or different algorithms. Informa tion leakage prevents such constructions from meet ing standard security requirements sought of them in cryptographic applications such as indistinguishabil ity (inability to link two records to the same biomet ric) and irreversibility (inability to reverse the con struction and directly recover information about the biometric). Some of the more popular constructions have been shown to have serious security weaknesses in presence of even very weak adversaries (Simoens et aI., 2009) . In this work, we analyze other schemes from the literature and show that they also cannot be safely reused. In particular, our novel analysis shows that the remaining constructions fail to satisfy stan dard security expectations with respect to reusability and therefore cannot be used in security applications.
In such schemes, information leakage is quanti fied as the entropy loss associated with the release of the helper string, providing a rough upper bound. For the current error rates and typical sets of parame ters in biometric data, the information theoretic anal ysis provides bounds that result in leakage of most or even all entropy contained in a biometric (see (Blan ton and Hudelson, 2009 ) for a sample iris code analy sis). Because this information leakage is unavoidable, it presents problems even in case of weak adversaries.
To overcome the issues of information leakage and unsafe reuse of biometrics, we propose to use the computational setting, where a user stores a single key and the adversary is computationally bounded. The key is introduced for the purpose of avoiding informa tion leakage and improving security of the schemes and does not change the functionality. We believe that keeping a single short key for all possible uses of biometric-based material in different security applica tions is a small price to pay for achieving significant security improvements (which otherwise are not pos sible) and the ability to safely use such constructions in a variety of applications. We show that the use of one key and standard computational assumptions (ex istence of pseudo-random and hash functions) is suf ficient for achieving very attractive properties using simple schemes. Our constructions are generic in that they can use any existing secure sketch scheme as a black box for any type of distance metric).
We would like to note that the use of the secret in our schemes should not be confused with multi-factor authentication or the use of shared secrets, as in our schemes the secret never leaves the user and is not shared and a single secret is sufficient for all possi ble uses including multiple biometric types, multiple applications, and multiple servers.
The security benefits of our schemes are:
• We achieve provably no information leakage.
• Previously, only certain restricted types of error correcting codes could be used to ensure security of fuzzy sketches and extractors (Boyen, 2004) . Our solution lifts such restrictions and can be used with any type of error-correcting code.
• Prior (Simoens et al., 2009 ) and our analysis of secure sketch constructions shows that they all fail to achieve standard security requirements for cryptographic applications, while our solution is secure in a much stronger adversarial model. • Previously, exposure of a biometric-derived key was shown to reveal no information about the bio metric for a specific construction in the random oracle model (Boyen, 2004) . Our construction, on the other hand, achieves this result in the standard model using any existing secure sketch. In our analysis of existing constructions, we use a very weak adversary. The security of our own schemes, on the other hand, is shown using a very strong adversary (the strongest in the literature).
To summarize, our contributions are two-fold: (i) new analysis of fuzzy sketch schemes that shows that even a weak adversary has a significant advantage in compromising security of existing constructions, and (ii) simple schemes that use a single secret to achieve strong security under standard assumptions.
2

MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
Fuzzy Sketches and Extractors
Secure (orfuzzy) sketches, introduced by (Dodis et al., 2004) , correct errors in noisy secrets by releasing a helper string S. Let W denote a random variable and w its value. Definition 1. A (M ,m,m',t)-secure sketch is a pair of randomized algorithms:
• 55 is a{unction that, on input w fr om metric space ']v{ with distance function dist , outputs a sketch S.
• Rec is a function that, on input w' E M and S = 55(w), recovers and outputs the original w
Secure sketches have been constructed for different metric spaces M, for which dist(a ,b ) is defined for all a, b EM. Security of a secure sketch is evaluated in terms of entropy of W before (m) and after (m') releasing the string S, i.e., the entropy loss m -m' as sociated with making S public. Precise definitions can be found in (Dodis et al., 2008) .
Fuzzy extractors allow one to extract randomness from w (to use it as cryptographic material) and later reproduce it using w' close to the original w. Definition 2. A (M ,m,m',t,£)-fuzzy extractor is a pair of algorithms:
• Gen is a function that, on input w EM, outputs extracted random string R and a helper string P.
• Rep is a function that, on input w' and P repro duces and outputs R that was generated using
The security requirement is that, for any W of min entropy m, the statistical distance between the distri bution of R and the uniform distribution of strings of the same length is no greater than £, even after ob serving P. A fuzzy extractor can be built from a se cure sketch using a generic construction from (Dodis et al., 2004) :
Rep (w', P = (S , r 2)): l. Execute w +-Rec (w',S ). If Rec fails (i.e., when dist(w, Wi) > t such that S = SS(w)), stop. 2. Extract R from w using r 2 as R +-Ext(w, r 2) and outputR. Strong extractors (Nisan and Ta-Shma, 1999) Metric-specific secure sketch constructions are known for the Hamming distance (used for iris codes), the set difference (used for fingerprints), and the edit distance (used for DNA comparisons). Also, the permutation-based construction is available for any transitive metric (e.g., Hamming distance and set intersection). Schemes for the Hamming distance have been most heavily analyzed, and some schemes are known to have security problems when reused on related biometrics. In this work we analyze remaining known constructions and show their insecurity.
2.2 Secure Sketch Constructions (Simoens et aI., 2009) show that two popular secure sketch constructions -the code offset construction with a linear error-correcting code (the syndrome con struction) and the construction based on permutation groups -do not withstand the requirements of indis tinguishability and reversibility, i.e., the adversary can win such experiments with overwhelming probability. The former scheme is for the Hamming distance (and is among the most widely studied schemes) and the latter is for any transitive distance metric. We con centrate on the analysis of other schemes and outline schemes for the set difference and edit distance. In R what follows, we use a +-A to denote that the value a is chosen uniformly at random from the set A.
The fuzzy vault scheme (Juels and Sudan, 2002) I. Create the set D of pairs (x; ,y;) such that X i E Wi.
2. Run Reed-Solomon decoding on D to recover the polynomial p( . ). 3. Output s points of the form (X i, p(x;)) from S .
Privacy of the biometric depends on the number and distribution of points S (i.e., the difficulty of identi fying the original points and the number of spurious polynomials created by the chaff points). The en tropy loss due to the release of S is upper bounded by t logn + log G) -log G=�) + 2.
Improved Fuzzy Vault. (Dodis et al., 2008) observed that the polynomial in the above construction does not need to be random, which allows for a secure sketch with significantly lower entropy loss, t log n. To compute SS(w):
2. Output the coefficients of pO of degree s -1 down to s -t, which will form SS(w) = (C ,-l, ... , cs -t ). To compute Rec (w' ,S = (cs -l , ... , cs -/ )):
I. Create a new polynomial Phi g h of degree s that shares the top t + 1 coefficients with pO, i.e.,
2. Evaluate Phi g h on points of Wi to obtain pairs (a ),b )), ... , (a "b s). 3. Use Reed-Solomon decoding to find a polynomial Plow of degree s -t -I such that Plow (a ;) = b ; for at least s -t /2 values of a ; 'so If none are found, output fail. 4. Output the roots of the polynomial Phi g h -Plow.
Another construction for set difference, Pinsketch, is suitable for large universe sizes and variable num ber of elements in w. It is syndrome-based, and its (in)security is not difficult to reduce to the previously analyzed code-offset scheme. We thus omit its anal ysis. For the edit distance, the only known way to construct a secure sketch is by embedding it into a transitive metric of larger dimension and applying a secure sketch construction to the target metric. An embedding with attractive properties was developed in (Dodis et aL, 2008) using Pinsketch. Once again, the insecurity of the resulting scheme can be shown using prior results and is omitted. This covers all se cure sketch schemes.
Security Notions
The original security definitions of fuzzy sketches and extractors were formulated for a single instance of a fuzzy sketch or extractor in isolation (Dodis et al., 2004) . Consecutive literature (Boyen, 2004; Simoens et aL, 2009 ) considered a stronger (and more re alistic) adversarial model where such constructions can be invoked multiple times and therefore the se curity guarantees must hold when the constructions are reused. Furthermore, the power granted to the adversary can greatly differ. In this work we use weak adversaries while analyzing existing construc tion (to show that they do not provide sufficient secu rity guarantees even in presence of weak adversaries) and strong adversaries when proving security of our proposed solution. In a nutshell, a weak adversary is given two fuzzy sketches and tries to detennine whether they were produced using related biometrics or what the biometric was, while a strong adversary can adaptively ask for fuzzy sketches and private keys that fuzzy extractors output.
Let t be the maximum amount of errors that the biometric system can tolerate. We define ill to be the set of all perturbation functions that represent differ ences in sampling biometric data; we get ill = {15 :
We next de fine a security game for weak adversaries with access to public sketches and then proceed with a security game for strong adversaries. Two security properties for weak adversaries were defined in (Simoens et aL, 2009) : sketch indistinguishability and irreversibility. The irreversibility property of a fuzzy sketch scheme means that an adversary who obtains access to multi ple sketches generated from the same noisy input us ing possibly different sketching functions is unable to recover the original input. In the current version of this work we do not treat irreversibility, since a fail ure to achieve the indistinguishability property alone points out weaknesses of a fuzzy sketch scheme. We now proceed with defining security games for more powerful adversaries using what we term weak biometric privacy and strong biometric privacy. In both of them the adversary is allowed to query the scheme a large number of times, but the difference is that in the first the adversary obtains access only to the public information, while in the second it also obtains access to the key output by a fuzzy extractor. Thus, we use the first definition for secure sketches and the second one for fuzzy extractors. The two security games below are roughly equiva lent to outsider and insider chosen perturbation secu rity in (Boyen, 2004) , but are stronger than the respec tive definitions in (Boyen, 2004) . In particular, in our definition of weak biometric security we require the adversary to only distinguish between two sketches, while the adversary was required to recover the bio metric w in (Boyen, 2004) . Furthermore, instead of allowing the adversary to query fuzzy sketches for a particular biometric w and then challenging the ad versary by asking it to distinguish between a sketch for w and a sketch for a randomly chosen biometric, we setup two biometrics Wo and Wl and allow the ad versary to query sketches for both. Then during the challenge, the adversary is asked to determine which biometric was used in producing the challenge sketch. This can give the adversary advantage over the prior fonnulation, especially in the computational setting where different users will possess different keys.
As our schemes work in the computational setting, we use K to denote the security parameter. All algo rithms are assumed to be polynomial time in K. Then a function c( K) is negligible if for all positive polyno mials pO and sufficiently large K c(K) < 1/ p(K). The next definition corresponds to the strongest version of the insider chosen perturbation security definition in (Boyen, 2004) . The adversary can query the challenger to obtain sketches on both related and unrelated biometrics and private key corresponding to unrelated biometrics. This time we ask the adver sary to distinguish between the secret key output by a fuzzy extractor on a related biometric and a ran domly chosen string. Note that we do not ask the ad versary to distinguish between biometric-derived keys of two users because the adversary has the choice of the sketch that it can use in the challenge. This means that the adversary will trivially know for which user the secret key will be produced. We, however, note that in order to distinguish secret keys corresponding to two users, the adversary need to be able to distin guish at least one of them from a random string. Thus, our definition of security will imply the security in the game with two users. Let Ll denote all perturba tion functions over space ']v{ , i.e., Ll = {o 
ANALYSIS OF EXISTING SCHEMES
Fuzzy Vault. Before proceeding with the analysis, we note that the basic idea for the strategy in attacking the fuzzy vault scheme when two or more sketches are available -computing the intersection of the points -is straightforward and is not new. This attack ap peared in (Scheirer and Boult, 2007; Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2008 ; Po on and Miri, 2009). We still an alyze the construction here because all previous pub lications assume that given sketches are related and proceed with identifying original points. Our work, however, assumes a significantly weaker (and perhaps more realistic) adversary that would like to determine if two given sketches are related or not, which is a much more difficult task. Therefore, we present a rigorous new analysis that shows weaknesses of the scheme even in the presence of the weakest adversary.
The adversary receives two secure sketches PI = {(Xl ,yJ), ... , (Xr ,Yr )} and P2 = {(x� ,y�), ... , (x�,y�) }, and its goal is to determine the coin flip, i.e., whether the biometrics WI and W2 are related or not. Let Pj and P2 denote projections of PI and P2, resp., on the x-coordinate, i.e., Pj = {Xl , ... ,Xr } and P2 = {x;, ... ,x�}. The basic attack idea is to compute the intersection of Pj and P2 and use its size to make a distinction between related and unrelated biometrics.
Related sketches will overlap in at least s -t orig inal biometric points, while unrelated sketches will have fewer original biometric points overlap. In addi tion, a number of chaff points in Pj can collide with chaff points in P2 or points in W2 \ (WI n W2) (simi larly, points from WI \ (WI nW2) can collide with chaff points in P2). Thus, the size of Pj n P2 follows a certain distribution, but the expected overlap size is larger for related sketches. We first analyze the prop erties of such a distribution.
Let Ct. = IWI n w21 denote the number of biomet ric points in the intersection, i.e., Ct. ::;:, s -t for related biometric samples and Ct. .-::: s -t -1 otherwise. Let a = r -Ct. and b = n -Ct., i.e., a is the number of sketch points that do not correspond to the overlapping bio metric points and b is the overall space for such points. As customary in the literature, we assume that the biometric points ofw are distributed uniformly in the space; the chaff points are also drawn uniform Iy at random from the remaining space. Then to de termine how many points from P( = Pj \ (WI n W2) will collide with points from Pi = P2 \ (WI nW2), sup pose there are b = n -Ct. bins and points from P( oc cupy a = r -Ct. of them, i.e., there are a random bins with a ball in them. Then we throw another a balls (points from Pi) into the bins without replacement and count the number of bins with two balls in them (i.e., if a bin has two balls, it is removed, so that no bin has more than two balls; this is dictated by the re quirement that all r points in a sketch are distinct). The above can be modeled as hypergeometric experi ment. Let X be a random variable that corresponds to the number of collisions in Pj and P2 (i.e, its size is I(PjnP2) \(Wl nW2)1 ). We obtain:
where X can range between 0 and a. This distribu tion's mean value is E[X] = a· (a/b).
This analysis leads to the following attack strat egy: given sketches PI and P2, .9l computes Pj, P2, and c = IPj n P21. Let 
.
i=O r-s+l+l This probability and Adv�d can be easily computed for a given set of parameters n, r, s, and t. In re ality, each parameter above has limitations placed on it by the behavior of the actual biometric data. In particular, (Clancy et al., 2003) study applicabil ity of the fuzzy vault construction to fingerprint data and determines optimal parameters to use to achieve adequate resistance of the construction against brute force search (when an adversary is given a sketch and tries to determine sensitive information by searching through polynomials). While the fuzzy vault con struction was not used exactly as a secure sketch in (Clancy et al., 2003) and was generalized, we nev ertheless obtain information about the parameters that would be used for fingerprint data. The field IF p2, for prime p, is used for representing fingerprint fea tures in 2-D and the value of p is set to 251 giving us n = 251 2 = 63001 (this value of n also provides many choices for the decoding algorithm). The number of biometric points in a fingerprint was empirically de termined on average to be s = 38 (it can vary based on the equipment and quality of data, but generally is in a similar range). For this value of s, having 20 points overlap would provide excellent distinguishing capa bility and low false acceptance rate (Pankanti et aI., 2002) . Finally, the value of r is constrained in that the complexity of decoding for legitimate users can grow as r increases (this is caused by spurious polynomi als introduced by the chaff points). In particular, at Improved Fuzzy Vault. An important observation in designing an attack strategy for this construction is that it is deterministic. This immediately implies that the same biometric will always produce the same se cure sketch, giving the adversary the ability to distin guish sketches. Thus, as an important special case we first consider the adversary's ability to win the indis tinguishability game when no noise affects multiple sketches of the same W (this arises in several applica tions, where multiple keys are issued using the same copy of w) . Thus, when Ji obtains challenge S2 , it outputs 1 if S2 = SI and 0 otherwise. This means that when b = 1, Ji will always guess the bit correctly, but when b = 0 it might still sometimes output I if the two sketches happened to be the same. The probabil ity of the latter, however, is small and can be bound as follows. Recall that sketch S consists of t coeffi cients of a polynomial p(x) = x ' + C,, _I X s-1 + ... + CI X + C o , where for W = {WI , ... , w s} Cs -
First, for an unrelated random biometric W, the prob ability that Li Wi = C , I_I is � (i.e., without any restrictions, there are I1 ;�6 (n -i) choices for s elements without repetitions from the set of n elements, and when the sum of the elements is fixed (in IF n ) , the number reduces to m�l (n -i)) .
Now consider C , I -2 . We start with a simpler func tion Xl X2 = b in IF n for a fixed value of b. Recall that n = p 2 for a prime p. We enumerate all pos sible solutions Xl and X2 for this function such that XI # X2 (since all points in a biometric are different). When b is zero, there are n-l unordered pairs (XI ,X2 ) with Xl # X2 whose product equals to b (one value is zero and the other can take n -I remaining values).
All elements other than zero form a cyclic multiplica tive group, and when b # 0 there are either n ; l or n ; 1 _ 1 pairs (Xl ,X2 ) with distinct Xl and X2 , when b is a quadratic non-residue or quadratic residue, resp .. Therefore, the number of pairs (XI ,X2 ) satisfying the congruence for any b is at most n -1 from the over all space of n ( n ; I ) such pairs, giving us the fraction (n-I);n ( n 2 -1 )
Now recall that C , I -2 is composed of a summa tion of products WiW, for each i # j. When there is only one product WlW2 (i.e., s = 2), we obtain that it is equal to 0 more frequently than to other values. When, however, s > 2 this is no longer the case. Be cause all Wi have to be unique and each Wi appears in a number of products WiW" the value of the sum tends to be distributed more evenly as s increases. This means that the frequency of the most common value of C , I -2 approaches � when s grows. To il lustrate this phenomenon, we plot empirical data for small values of n = p 2 . In particular, for s = 2, 4, and 6 and all possible W = (WI , ... , W,) E IF� we find the value of the sum which occurs the highest num ber of times. Let it be denoted by countmax and the fraction of all biometrics W that results in such value by fmax = countmax/ (7). To evaluate how the value of fmax compares to �, we plot their ratio fmax/ � in Figure 2 . For s = 2, fmax = � is constant; for s > 2 it is clear that fmax rapidly approaches � from the above even for very small values of s. This means that � is a generous upper bound on the probability that Cs -2 of a randomly chosen W will coincide with a specific value of that coefficient for an unrelated biometric w.
Extending this analysis to Cs-3 = L WiW,Wk, where i, j, and k are pairwise distinct, we obtain that the most frequently occurring value of C , I -3 is 0 and when s = 3 (i.e., only one product). In that case, the number of possibilities that result in that product is ( n-I h ( n-2 ) out of n ( n-� ) � n-2 ) total choices (and the number of 1.4
The value of n 289 361
Figure 2: The ratio of the fr action of most fr equent value of the sum Cs-2 to * for varying n and s.
possibilities when the product is non-zero is at most n;3 . n; 1 ). Thus, the fraction of triples that can result in any given product is -s: �. For C,\-4, the maximum fraction is -s: �; for Cs-5, it is -s: �, etc. Therefore, the adversarial error is at most �, and in practice will be close to ;It because s > t. Both of these quantities are very low even for small values of t (such as 2), and the probability with which the adversary considers two unrelated biometrics to be related is very small. The above analysis addresses an important special case of w = w'. We defer analysis of the more gen eral case of related sketches to the full version.
OUR CONSTRUCTIONS
In what follows, let (55', Rec') denote any existing fuzzy sketch scheme (for any metric). The key k de notes the long-term user's key of size K, where K is the security parameter. This key k is not shared with any parties. We first provide additional definitions. A family of functions h : {O, I V x {O, I} n ---+ {O, I }f 2 ( K ) is pairwise independent univer sal hash function iffor all x,x' E {O, I } n , where x # x, Pr[hy(x) = hy(x')] = I /2£ 2 ( K ) for y E {O, IV.
In the following secure sketch construction, it is re quired that 1'1 (K) � ISS'(w)l, where lal is the length of string a. We discuss the choice of parameters later. To compute SS(w,k):
To compute Ree(w',k,S = (S1,S2)):
Theorem 1. Assuming that F is afamily of PRFs, the above fuzzy sketch scheme achieves weak biometric privacy.
We omit security proofs due to space constraints.
Note that in our construction deterministic schemes for the underlying 55' are preferred because they produce most concise sketches. So far we as sumed that the output length of F, 1'J (K), is at least as large as the output length of secure sketch ISS' (w) I.
While this will hold for many types of biometrics and a reasonable choice of security parameter K, in some cases the representation of 55' (w) can be longer. In stead of increasing K, we suggest modifying the al gorithm to use more than one application of F to produce a longer pseudo-random sequence. For in stance, if 1'J(K) < ISS'(w)1 -s: 21'J(K), the sketch can be produced as (rJ, (Fk(rJ) IIFk( (rJ + I) mod 2K)) EB SS'(w)), where II denotes string concatenation. This increases the number of random values on which F is evaluated and thus the probability of their collision.
However, as long as ISS'(w)I/1'1 (K) is a constant or polynomial in K, the security guarantees still hold.
In the fuzzy extractor construction below we split the key k into two keys k1 and k2. This is done to simplify the analysis. In practice, the sub-keys kJ and k2 can be computed by applying a PRF keyed with k to two different inputs.
To compute Gen(w,k1 ,k2): l. Compute S = SS(w,kJ) using the fuzzy sketch scheme above. When it is desirable that failures during reconstruc tion are not reported explicitly, Rep can be modified to output a (wrong) private string, e.g., computed as R = Fk 2 (hp 2 (w')).
We would like to explain the design choices made in our construction. Because a PRF is a powerful primitive, it by itself is sufficient to produce the pri vate string R indistinguishable from random. For ex ample, setting R +---Fk 2 (wllr) for random r would sat isfy the security game requirements. The reason for including the hash function h in the construction is to compress the biometric w without loosing the amount of its unpredictability. That is, the n-bit representation of biometric is normally substantially longer than the m bits of entropy it contains. For example, for iris the standard values of these parameters are n = 2048 and m = 256. Because m rv K, we can use a hash function h: {O, 1 Y x {O, 1 Y ---+ {O, l}m to reduce the size ofw from n to m bits without loosing its entropy. In cases when the value of m exceeds the desired length of the input to a PRF, the hash function output length can be further reduced, i.e., in general £2 (K) .-::: m.
We note that the generic conversion of a secure sketch to a fuzzy extractor (in Section 2.1) uses a strong extractor, which can be built using a uni \ er sal hash function alone. The use of the hash functIOn in a strong extractor is, however, constrained in that the output length of the extractor must necessarily be smaller than m to be able to meet the requirement of the output being close to the uniform distribution. In particular, at least 210g( !) -2 bits of entro � y .
are lo � t, where the parameter £ determines the statlstlcal dIS tance between distribution of the output and the uni form distribution. In our case, no requirements on the uniformity of the output must be met, and therefore no reduction of the output length or entropy loss has to take place.
Theorem 2. Assuming that F is af amily of PRFs and h is a universal hash function, the above fuzzy extractor scheme achieves strong biometric privacy.
We would like to note that certain constructions of PRFs are known to produce uniformly distributed se quences. For example, (Shparlinski, 2001) shows that PRF in (Naor and Reingold, 1997) has this property for almost all values of parameters. For us this means that the adversary does not obtain advantage in distin guishing pseudo-random strings from random.
We also note that similar results can be achieved by using encryption instead of PRF, and such schemes might be known or used in industry.
RELATED WORK
The overall literature on fuzzy sketches and extrac tors is extensive, and we therefore highlight the most fundamental results and analysis related to this work. (Davida et al., 1998) proposed the first off-line bio metric identification scheme, where error-correcting codes were used to reconstruct a biometric from its noisy readings. (Juels and Wattenberg, 1999) devel oped a fuzzy commitment scheme, which became the basis of the code-offset secure sketch for the Ham ming distance. (luels and Sudan, 2002) proposed a fuzzy vault scheme. (Dodis et al., 2004; Dodis et al., 2008) formalized the notion of secure sketches and fuzzy extractors in their seminal work, which gave a generic conversion from a secure sketch to a fuzzy extractor and developed a number of other schemes. (Boyen et aI., 2005) introduced robust fuzzy ex tractors secure against active adversaries, where the reconstruction process fails if the sketch has been tampered with. (Dodis et al., 2006) continue that line of research and also study the keyed setting in the bounded storage model. The use of the key in our set ting is fundamentally different from that work, where two parties share a long-term secret key and use it to generate a session key for data authentication. Our constructions can potentially be applied to a robust fuzzy extractor to improve reusability properties.
There are also publications that combine fuzzy extractors with passwords to improve their security properties such as (Ballard et al., 2008) . This work offers a simpler and more flexible construction.
Security requirements for adequate use of fuzzy sketches and extractors in cryptographic applications have been developing over time. (Boyen, 2004) showed that a number of original constructions can not be safely applied multiple times to the same bio metric. That work developed improved constructions using certain error-correcting codes and permutation groups that satisfy the reusability requirements. � ur security definitions for the strong adversary were In fluenced by that work. Compared to (Boyen, 2004) , our solution leaks no information about the biomet ric data (while leakage is unavoidable in the setting of (Boyen, 2004) ) and works for all distance metrics and all secure sketch schemes in the standard model (while Boyen's scheme is limited to special codes and a particular metric in the random oracle model). (Scheirer and Boult, 2007) proposed three classes of attacks on secure sketches and fuzzy vault in partic ular, one of which is equivalent to sketch reusability. [t has been empirically evaluated in (Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2008) on the fuzzy vault scheme using 200 matching pairs of fuzzy vault sketches. The authors were able to unlock (i.e., reconstruct the polynomial) [ [8 out of 200 pairs within a short period of time. We note that this evaluation was performed on a specific set of parameters already knowing that two stored sketches are related. Our analysis, on the other hand, is more general and can be applied to a wide variety of parameters. It is also does not assume prior knowl edge of related sketches, but rather helps to identify those records. (Poon and Miri, 2009 ) also describe collusion attacks on the fuzzy vault scheme assuming that the sketches are related. Finally, (Simoens et aI., 2009) introduced the notions of indistinguishability and irreversibility for reusable sketches and showed weaknesses of code-offset and permutation groups constructions. We analyze other constructions with respect to the indistinguishability property. (Kelk boom, 2010) also analyzes certain schemes.
CONCLUSIONS
This work investigates the reusability properties of secure sketch and fuzzy extractor constructions. Through new analysis we show that, in addition to the schemes that have been previously shown to have security weaknesses, other existing schemes do not meet our security expectations. To mitigate the prob lem, we propose to use the computational setting. Maintenance of a single key for all uses of such schemes results in solutions with remarkable secu rity and usability improvements which are not possi ble otherwise. [n particular, our general construction works with any existing secure sketch and mitigates information leakage associated with biometrics in the standard model under generic hardness assumptions.
